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USIB-S-9.4/13
7 May 1970

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Programming

REFERENCE : USIB-S-9.4/11, 10 April 1970

1. In restricted session at the 30 April USIB meeting with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration and Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office in attendance, the Acting Chairman, General Cushman, opened discussion on this item by noting that the intelligence guidance was a monumental task accomplished on an inter-agency basis and was a result of four to six years of effort. He stated that it was noteworthy for its cooperative effort and that it ties in the intelligence requirements with resources available. General Cushman noted that this was requested by the Department of Defense. He commented that the work of the SIGINT Committee was a concerted effort to sort out the intelligence requirements of the community. The Acting Chairman said that the method employed in developing the guidance was not to list all the known needs in priority order but to present varying degrees of concentration of effort in terms of both collection and reporting requirements. He expressed the hope and expectation that this effort would further our cooperative effort to meet the serious problem of needs and resources in the future.

2. [redacted] Chairman of the SIGINT Committee, introduced [redacted] Chairman of the Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee, stating that [redacted] had been the guiding light over the years in

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NRO review(s) completed.

NSA review(s) completed.

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developing the current guidance. He said he also wished to pay respect to the intensive and time-consuming effort of the members of [redacted] Subcommittee as well as to members of the SIGINT Committee. [redacted] stated that while he had tried, within the time available, to achieve coordination with the chairmen of the six USIB Committees having an interest in this guidance, he inadvertently erred in his transmittal to the Board by stating that the IGCP had been coordinated with the committees themselves. Except in the case of GMAIC none of the chairmen had indicated any problems. In the GMAIC case it was possible to incorporate one of the suggestions presented. Another, however, will be considered in the follow-up actions noted at Tab B of his transmittal memo. He added that unless the Board directed otherwise, the SIGINT Committee would proceed on follow-up actions as appropriate as outlined in that Tab.

3. The Acting Chairman observed that, while initially it was planned to review the guidance annually, it seemed more useful as proposed by the SIGINT Committee to initiate changes when required by changes in intelligence needs or resources. In that connection General Cushman invited the Board's attention to the follow-up actions in Tab B with special attention to paragraph 4 of Tab B. He believed that this paragraph should include the understanding that, where impending changes in resources are required, the Board should get together with the Director, NSA, so that it could consider and advise on the effect these changes would have on intelligence needs and what might best be done.

4. The Army representative in addressing the Army issue noted that [redacted]

He stated that information regarding this type of exercise was important since sound judgments on U.S. and NATO strategy and force structure require a better understanding of the Soviet ground and tactical air

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potential, especially in the Central European area. He observed that we did not know enough about the Soviet mobilization and support systems. He amplified by noting that there had been [redacted] report, and that photographic coverage had been blanked out by cloud cover. He recognized that the recommended change in this COMINT guidance would not solve the entire problem but that it would be a step forward in giving us more information. Hence, Army had requested Board consideration.

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5. In responding to the Acting Chairman's question of the view of the SIGINT Committee on this matter, [redacted] said the consensus believed this subject would be more appropriately addressed in its paper, now in preparation for the Board, on the five year R&D requirements for NRO.

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7. Dr. Naka of NRO stated he did not have enough information regarding the Army proposal and would have to study the problem and therefore reserved comment for a later time.

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8. The State member commented that he fully recognized the validity of the Army requirement but felt that it was unwise to add it as a specific requirement in the intelligence guidance. He noted that other needs also exist and it was not necessary or desirable to spell out the Army need and place special emphasis on it.

9. After further discussion, the Acting Chairman determined that, while the Board recognized the need for more complete information on the Soviet Ground Forces, the consensus was that the IGCP should not be modified as proposed by the Army.

10. In response to the Acting Chairman's invitation for general comment, Mr. Cline stated that he believed the document was realistic and would be most useful in assisting decision making. He noted that it was somewhat ironic that the guidance called for an increase of [] people to meet high priority needs, but that during the current budget climate it will probably be necessary to address what can be done to reduce or adjust resources. He said he hoped the Board would be able to give helpful and constructive comments when it is advised of proposals for impending changes in resource allocation.

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11. Mr. Proctor seconded Mr. Cline's comments, and said he was particularly pleased with the guidance for reporting which should make it more manageable for NSA.

12. Admiral Gayler stated that he was pleased with the screening accomplished by the SIGINT Committee and the Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee, adding that the guidance will help NSA in responding to the needs of the customer. He observed that existing resources are not enough to meet all of the requirements. He agreed that updating the guidance as required was preferable to annual review. He said it was useful to link needs with resources but cautioned against including too much resource detail. Any guidance is most helpful to him when it is stated in broader terms since he as the cryptologic program manager for the SCAs as well as NSA must

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make the day to day adjustments. He also stated that too much detail would tend to get out of date as soon as published. He concluded saying that, while the guidance had more detail than necessary, he would use it as general guidance.

13. General Cushman noted that since there was agreement the Proposed Guidance for COMINT Programming was approved.

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Executive Secretary

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